Kelty Hearts vs Montrose
Challenge Cup · Scotland · 26 Sept 2026, 14:00 UTC
Proof this pick was locked in before kickoff
The pick was encrypted before kickoff and published the moment it was sealed to Telegram and GitHub, each carrying an independent timestamp. The encrypted batch is also anchored in Bitcoin — a public record nobody, including us, can alter or back-date. After the match the key is released; decrypting that exact pre-published message reveals the pick, proving it was fixed in advance, not cherry-picked.
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
353505b96741539b1542bee8cea6225369c029cec395ca064c62748f672d33f5Decrypt in CyberChef →
Verify it yourself — paste both values, no install
The Encrypted pick above is base64( nonce[12 bytes] + ciphertext + tag[16 bytes] ),
AES-256-GCM. Zero-install check: open your browser console (press F12 → Console),
paste this, press Enter — it decrypts the exact pick shown above:
const blob = Uint8Array.from(atob("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"), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
const key = Uint8Array.from("353505b96741539b1542bee8cea6225369c029cec395ca064c62748f672d33f5".match(/../g).map(h => parseInt(h, 16)));
crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", key, "AES-GCM", false, ["decrypt"])
.then(k => crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv: blob.slice(0, 12) }, k, blob.slice(12)))
.then(b => console.log(new TextDecoder().decode(b).split("\n")[0])); Prefer a GUI? The orange button opens CyberChef pre-filled. Or split the parts yourself for any AES-256-GCM tool:
- Algorithm:
AES-256-GCM - Key (hex):
353505b96741539b1542bee8cea6225369c029cec395ca064c62748f672d33f5 - IV / nonce (hex):
86be230072220d3c4af0a911 - Ciphertext (hex):
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 - Auth tag (hex):
c6436398bb27207687a1d7b541706d0e
Any standard AES-256-GCM tool returns the exact same pick — the algorithm is a public standard.
The pick is the first line of the decrypted text. Records sealed from 24 September 2026
are followed by a line break and spaces up to a fixed size, so every encrypted pick has the same length
and its size reveals nothing about the selection before the key is published. The commitment hash is
sha256(first line + key), exactly as before.
How to verify the Bitcoin timestamp yourself
Bitcoin doesn't store the pick — it stores a 32-byte fingerprint (SHA-256) of the
encrypted batch, via OpenTimestamps. That fingerprint is frozen in a public block nobody can alter
or back-date. You can't spot it by eye on a block explorer (a block holds thousands of unrelated
transactions) — you verify it with the .ots proof and any OpenTimestamps tool:
- Download the sealed batch file (.jsonl) and its proof (.ots) from GitHub.
- Drop both into opentimestamps.org (or run
ots verify *.ots). It replays the proof and confirms the Bitcoin block and its UTC time. - See it independently: block #968565 · anchoring transaction (its OP_RETURN holds the commitment). The block's Timestamp is when it became permanent.
Note: Bitcoin anchoring lands ~30–60 min after sealing, and a block's timestamp is miner-set (approximate). So the exact “before kickoff” proof is the seal time above — timestamped instantly by Telegram/GitHub — while Bitcoin is the independent, un-forgeable anchor of permanence.